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Abstract
It is well known that classical set theory is not expressive enough to adequately model categorization and prototype theory. Re-
cent work on compositionality and concept determination showed that the quantitative solution initially offered by classical fuzzy
logic also led to important drawbacks. Several qualitative approaches were thereafter tempted, that aimed at modeling member-
ship through ordinal scales or lattice fuzzy sets. Most of the solutions obtained by these theoretical constructions however are of
difficult use in categorization theory. We propose a simple qualitative model in which membership relative to a given concept f
is represented by a function that takes its value in a finite abstract set Af equipped with a total order. This function is recursively
built through a stratification of the set of concepts at hand based on a notion of complexity. Similarly, the typicality associated with
a concept f will be described using an ordering that takes into account the characteristic features of f . Once the basic notions of
membership and typicality are set, the study of compound concepts is possible and leads to interesting results. In particular, we
investigate the internal structure of concepts, and obtain the characterization of all smooth subconcepts of a given concept.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we propose a new framework for the study of some basic notions classically used in categorization
theory. In particular, we shall be concerned with the problem of finding a suitable theoretical apparatus to model the
notions of membership and typicality that underlie prototype theory. It is well recognized since the work of Eleanor
Rosch [18] that membership, for instance, is not an all-or-not matter: the classical set-theoretical or the two-value
logic model are of therefore of little use to render count of most of the cognition process. This drove Zadeh and his
followers [24] and [25] to propose a representation of concepts by fuzzy sets, membership being modeled through a
real function with values in the unit interval. Such a representation nevertheless lead to counterintuitive results: see for
instance the seminal papers of Kamp and Partee and of Osherson and Smith [12,16,17]. At a quite elementary level,
for instance, it was observed that the membership degree relative to a compound concept could never be greater than
the degree induced by any of its components, a result that cannot be accepted for both theoretical and experimental
reasons. Even for elementary concepts, the representation of concepts as quantitative fuzzy sets poses problems:
vague concepts like to-be-an-adult or to-lie are given continuous values in the unit interval, but what does it mean
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there is no reason why the same set–the unit interval—should serve as a uniform criterion, being invariably referred
to as a measure of membership whatever the concept at hand. True, in practice membership is often evaluated through
statistical data, and the membership degree identified with a simple frequency. But the fact that, say, 87 individuals
out of 100 consider a car seat as a piece of furniture by no means involves that, in an agent mind, the membership
degree of a car-seat relative to the concept to-be-a-piece-of-furniture is equal .87.
These drawbacks led to various solutions which all aimed at replacing the primitive quantitative model by a qual-
itative one: thus, attention focused on ordinal scales and on lattice fuzzy sets—see for instance [11] or [25]. For a
brief analysis of the most recent work on this area, the reader may refer to [14] or [3]. However, we consider that the
solutions that were proposed are not fully adapted to model prototype theory, and that they cannot be easily exploited
to address the classical questions raised by categorization theory.
In a different area, Peter Gärdenfors [9] or [8] proposed a geometrical model as a framework for concept theory:
a concept is defined as a convex region of a multidimensional space, each dimension corresponding to a basic quality.
Convexity is related with a notion of betweenness that is supposed to be meaningful for the relevant quality dimen-
sions: if two objects are exemplars of a concept, such will be the case for any object that lies ‘between’ them. The
typical instances of a concept are those which are located ‘near the center’ of the considered region. This Geometry
of Thought, as the author calls it, provides interesting tracks in the analysis of concepts. However, it is mostly based
on quantitative notions, which we find not best appropriate to model the cognition process. Furthermore, it does not
seem that the distinction between vague and sharp concepts is fully taken into account.
For these reasons, we propose to revisit the basic notions linked with categorization theory and treat them from
a qualitative point of view. Concerning membership, for instance, and rather than dealing with uniform gradation
functions that take their values in the unit interval, we represent membership relative to a concept by a function whose
set of values depends on the chosen concept. This set is endowed with a total order that can be used to evaluate to
which degree a object falls under this concept. We think indeed that such a representation is the most adequate to
model notions like: object x plainly falls under the concept f , object x falls definitely not under the concept f or
object x falls more than object y under the concept f . These notions, which are the basis of categorization theory, are
also the firsts one should deal with in order to understand the problems that arise with vague concepts: for instance,
an agent may consider that an elevator is definitely less a vehicle than a chairlift, while being unable at the same time
to attribute a precise numerical membership degree to any of these items. We propose in this paper an example of
construction such an order, by making use of the set of defining features attached to the concepts at hand. Postulating
the existence of such a set is part of most of the theories on categorization: see for instance [1,4,21,22] or more
recently [2], where a concept is assimilated with a set of properties which things that fall under the concept typically
have or are believed to have. These defining features, from the point of view of the agent, help understanding the
chosen concept; they are individually necessary and collectively sufficient to decide whether or not an item is an
exemplar of this concept. Given a vague concept f , we shall use this associated defining feature set to compare the
f -membership of two items in the following way: an object x will be considered as falling less under f than an object
y if it falls less than y under the f -defining features. The circularity of this definition will be avoided by attributing
to each concept a complexity level: the sharp concepts, those for which membership is an all-or-not matter, will be
given complexity level 0; at level 1, we shall rank all the vague concepts whose defining feature set only consists
of sharp concepts; at level 2, we will have the vague concepts whose defining feature set consists of concepts that
have complexity level equal to 0 or 1, and so on. This ranking will eventually render possible a recursive definition of
membership, and, consequently, the construction of a membership order among the set of objects at hand.
Having represented concepts by means of order-functions poses the problem of finding an adequate representation
of the notion of typicality. Since the work of E. Rosch, a considerable amount of study has been carried out on this
notion, and it is now widely accepted that, relative to a given concept, objects may be classified following their degree
of typicality. Although a precise and general definition of this typicality degree is still missing, one generally agrees on
the fact that such a degree has to faithfully reflect the number of characteristic features attached to the concept at hand,
together with the relative pertinence, or the frequency, of these features [15, Chapter 2]. Nevertheless the attempts at a
rigorous construction are rare, and none of them seem to have gained general recognition. Besides, researchers in this
domain restricted themselves to elementary cases, dealing with sharp concepts, for which membership is an all-or-not
matter, or with concepts with sharp features. In particular, they did not seem to be concerned with situations in which
the typicality relative to a concept depends on the membership relative to another concept: in order to determine the
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membership degree relative to the concept to-fly. We think on the contrary that typicality must be determined through
membership, and that these two notions are correlated
We therefore propose the construction of a ‘typicality order’—in fact a partial preorder—clear and easy to evaluate,
that faithfully conforms with our intuition. This order is meant to reflect a particular agent’s judgment at a precise
time. It is based on the agent’s choice, for each concept, of a an associated characteristic feature set, partially ordered
through a salience relation that is meant to evaluate the relative importance of these features. The typicality of two
items will be compared by investigating the characteristic features that apply to them, the way they apply to them, and
their relative salience. Once we have completed the construction of the typicality order, it will be possible to define
the typical instances of a concept as those that have maximal order, that is those that fall under all the characteristic
features of this concept. This definition of typicality will then enable us to define the intension of a concept as the set
of features that apply to all typical instances of the concept. Thus, the intension of a concept may be interpreted as
the set of characteristic features that agents belonging to a well-defined cultural environment would generally agree
to associate with this concept: it enlarges the more subjective notion of characteristic features sets.
A coherent theory of typicality must be able to correctly address the problem of compound concepts. We shall
show that our formalism provides natural and intuitive answers concerning composed concepts, provided one departs
from the idea that the logic of concepts boils down to a simple propositional calculus. Indeed we do not agree with
the commonly admitted postulate following which the negation of a concept, the conjunction or the disjunction of two
concepts should be again a concept: we do not consider that not-to-be-an-apple or (to-be-an-apple)&(to-be-a-pear)
are concepts. Consequently, we believe that the treatment of such sentences, which clearly goes beyond the limits
of the elementary concept theory we are dealing with, should be addressed only after a coherent logical framework
for categorization has been proposed. In the present work, we shall therefore content ourselves with a language that
only admits a single partial operator, the determination connective, which is meant to represent the determination
of a principal concept by a secondary one: for instance, the concept to-be-a-green-apple is the determination of the
principal concept to-be-an-apple by the secondary one, to-be-green. Concept determination is not compositional,
except in some limit cases: this means that neither the membership, nor the typicality relative to a composed concept
can be directly evaluated through a computation of the corresponding magnitudes of its components. However, it
remains possible to determine the typical order, hence the typical instances of a composed concept, via the typicality
orders induced by its components. This result is important as it can be considered as an answer to the compositionality
problem.
1.1. Plan of this paper
After introducing in Section 2 the framework we are going to work in and recall the distinction between sharp
and vague concepts, we shall introduce in Section 3 the membership orders and functions associated with elementary
concepts. In Section 4, we shall present the determination connective and extend the membership order to compound
concepts. We shall then turn to typicality, and build in Section 5 the typicality order associated with elementary
and compound concepts. In Section 6, we show how the notion of smooth subconcepts can be formalized through the
determination connective, and we propose an interpretation of our results in the language of Formal Concept Analysis.
Section 7 is a conclusion in which we discuss our future work.
2. Concepts and objects
We denote by O the universe of discourse, which we may see as the set of all objects, real or fictive, that an
agent has at his disposal. Together with this set, we suppose given a set F of concepts. These concepts constitute the
elementary items on which the agent builds its reasoning process, and they reflect its knowledge on the world at a
given time. A concept applies to an object if it describes a property that this object possesses, or if it is an attribute
of this object. For instance, the concept to-be-a-fruit applies to the object an-apple. We will say indifferently that the
concept f applies to the object x, that x falls under f , or that x is an instance of f . In the classical theory, where
categories were modeled through set theory, membership relative to a concept was an all-or-none matter: an object
could not partially fall under a concept. This perspective was also that of Frege [5], for whom concepts were defined as
one-place predicates having a bivalent membership truth function. With prototype theory and the evidence that there
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this primitive notion of concepts had to be enlarged and that membership was a question of degree, rather than an
all-or-none matter. As observed in [12], “We all have strong intuitions that the concepts encoded by many natural-
language predicates are vague; whether something is a chair, or is red, does not seem to be an all-or-none matter but
a matter of degree; there may be some clear positive cases and some clear negative cases, but there are many unclear
cases in between.”
Sharp concepts are defined as those for which membership is an all-or-not matter: an object simply falls or does
not fall under such a concept, without the possibility of taking intermediate values. To-be-a-human-being, to-be-a-
tooth-brush, to-be-an-even-integer may provide examples of sharp concepts. This definition has nevertheless to be
understood as tightly related with a given agent’s point of view, and we shall always consider that we work from a
particular subjective perspective, and at a particular time: the same concept may appear as sharp to a non-expert agent
while being considered as vague for an expert. For vague concepts, membership is indeed not an all-or-not-matter:
such are for instance the concepts to-be-a-lie, to-be-poor, to-be-employed, to-be-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction or
to-be-a-mammal. Indeed, politeness sometimes drives us to make compliments that, although not sincere, cannot be
considered as real lies; to be poor or to be employed is clearly a matter of degree; a gun is more a WMD than a knife;
and the platypus is and is not a mammal. Of course, opinions may differ whether a given concept should be considered
as a sharp or a vague one, but, and this is the important point, it is well recognized that both kinds of concepts
exist. An interesting suggestion of [1] is that, for noun concepts, the opposition between nominal and non-nominal
categories reflects the duality between vague and sharp concepts: nominal categories can be defined through their
defining features, and may therefore give rise to vague concepts, while non-nominal cannot. Non-nominal categories
may be themselves divided between natural kind categories (e.g.: the category of tigers or of games) and artifact
categories (e.g.: the category of hammers, walls, cars). Note that the distinction between nominal and natural kind
concepts is far from being evident: a same concept may be considered as nominal for an expert, and as non-nominal
for a non-expert agent. For instance, the concept to-be-a-bird is undoubtedly of a natural kind for a child, but it may
turn later to a nominal one once the child has learnt that all and only those animals that have beak and feathers are to
be considered as birds. In deciding whether the concept to-be-a-bird is or not a sharp concept, we have therefore to
first analyze which of these two concepts we are referring to: an agent aware that birdhood may be defined through
the sum of a certain number of conditions, will consider to-be-a-bird a vague concept: the octopus, for instance will
be more a bird than the bat, since the octopus has a beak. On the other hand, for a child, to-be-a-bird is bond to be a
sharp concept, and the penguin will simply not be a member of the category, while the bat will.
In the present work, we shall not address the problem of determining which concepts are vague and which are not.
We shall only be concerned with the problem of finding an adequate model that correctly describes how the notion of
membership is used in a given agent’s behavior.
3. Membership for elementary concepts
In the original fuzzy logic model, a membership degree function is attributed to each concept, measuring how
accurately this concept applies to the objects at hand. This degree however is not explicitly present in an agent’s mind:
this is so for example for young children, for whom notions like real numbers or unit interval are totally meaningless.
Nevertheless, given a concept, the agent will be generally able to decide whether two objects have the same or different
membership degrees, and which one, in the latter case, has higher degree: for instance, the agent may decide that the
concept to-be-a-piece-of-furniture applies more to a car-seat than to a blackboard, without being able at the same
time to attribute a numerical membership degree to any of these items. In other words, the agent associates with each
concept f an implicit notion of a membership order. It is this order we now want to build.
We shall first deal with elementary concepts, leaving the case of compound concepts in the next section. In order
to correctly define a suitable notion of membership for vague concepts, we start from the widely accepted theory
following which each such concept f is given together with a finite auxiliary set Δf which, from the point of view of
the agent, includes all the features that explain or illustrate f , helping differentiating it from its neighboring concepts.
For instance, for the concept to-be-a-bird, the corresponding Δf may consist of the concepts to-be-a-vertebrate,
to-have-a-beak and to-have-feathers; for the concept to-be-a-tent, it may list the features to-be-a-shelter, to-be-made-
of-cloth. We interpret Δf as the set of defining features an agent or a group of agents would associate with f . The sets
Δf may be seen as the outputs a dictionary or an encyclopedia would return when given vague concepts as inputs.
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an help for the understanding of f . This notion of complexity will be now given a precise meaning by attributing a
complexity level c(f ) to the set F of concepts at hand in the following way:
• Sharp concepts are given complexity level 0.
• If Δf consists of sharp concepts, set c(f ) = 1.
• If c(g) has been defined for all concepts g of Δf , set c(f ) = 1 + Max(c(g))g∈Δf .
We shall make the assumption that this procedure attributes a well-defined complexity level to every element of F .
In other words, our theory only applies to a set F that consists of concepts that either are sharp, or can be recursively
defined through sharp concepts. Such concepts may be qualified as constructible. As a matter of fact, most of the
elementary concepts one commonly deals with are constructible, with small complexity level, and we could have
made the assumption that the set of concepts at hand solely consists of concepts f of level less than 3. However we
find it more convenient to work in a more general framework, as the results are not more difficult to establish.
It may be the case that some elements of Δf are more important than others, when considered as a help for defining
or illustrating f : for instance, given the concept to-be-a-bird, an agent may think that the feature to-have-wings is more
salient than the feature to-be-an-animal, while both features may be part of the same set Δf . Thus, it is necessary to
endow each set Δf with a (possibly empty) salience relation that reflects the relative importance of its elements as
defining features of f . In its most general form, such a relation will be represented by a strict partial order >f . This
order has to be taken into account when comparing the f -membership of two items: an object x that falls under the
most salient defining features of f will be considered a better instance of f than an object y that only falls under
some non-salient defining feature of f .
We can now proceed to the construction of the membership preorder relation μf , which will be defined on the
set of objects O, and to the construction of the membership function ϕf , which will take its values in a finite totally
ordered set (Af ,<f ). We shall omit the subscripts when there is no ambiguity. We begin with the simplest case of
sharp concepts:
Definition 1. For every elementary sharp concept f , Af is the set {0,1}, and ϕf the function: ϕf (x) = 1 if x falls
under f and ϕf (x) = 0 otherwise. The associated membership preorder is defined by x μf y if ϕf (x) ϕf (y).
The membership preorder and the membership function relative to an arbitrary elementary concept f will be now
defined by induction on c(f ). This will be done in two steps.
3.1. The elementary membership order
Definition 2. Let f be an elementary concept, and suppose that the finite totally ordered sets (Ag,<g) and the
membership functions ϕg have been defined for all elementary concepts g such that c(g) < c(f ). The relation μf is
then defined by:
x μf y if for any concept h of Δf such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), there exists a concept k of Δf , k >f h, such that
ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
The relation μf thus compares the ways objects inherit the defining features of f , while taking into account
the relative salience of these features. We will say that a preorder of this type is induced by the (ordered) set Δf .
In the particular case where the salience order on Δf is empty, the relation boils down to: x μf y if and only if
ϕh(x)h ϕh(y) for all h in Δf , that is if and only if no defining feature of f applies more to x than to y.
The hypothesis that, for k ∈ Δf , the membership functions ϕk take their value in a totally ordered set guarantees
the transitivity of the relation μf . More precisely we have the following result:
Lemma 1. For any elementary concept f , the relation μ is a partial preorder on O.f
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suppose that x, y and z are three objects such that x μf y and y μf z. We want to show that x μf z. Supposing that
there exists a concept h of Δf such that ϕh(z) < ϕh(x), we have to prove the existence of a concept k ∈ Δf , k more
salient than h, such that ϕk(x) < ϕk(z). We make a proof by cases:
• Suppose first that ϕh(x)  ϕh(y). Then we have ϕh(z) < ϕh(y), and there exists therefore a concept k of Δf ,
k >f h, such that ϕk(y) < ϕk(z). We can suppose that k is maximal in Δf for this property (Δf is a finite set). If
ϕk(x) ϕk(y), we get ϕk(x) < ϕk(z) and we are done. If ϕk(y) < ϕk(x), the hypotheses imply that there exists a
concept g in Δf , g >f k such that ϕg(x) < ϕg(y). We cannot have ϕg(z) < ϕg(y), otherwise there would exist a
concept l in Δf , l >f g, such that ϕl(y) < ϕl(z), which would contradict the maximality of k. We have therefore
ϕg(y) ϕg(z) and it follows that ϕg(x) < ϕg(z) as desired.
• Suppose now that we have ϕh(y) < ϕh(x). There exists k ∈ Δf , k >f h, such that ϕk(x) < ϕk(y). Again, we can
suppose that k is maximal in Δf for these properties. If ϕk(y)  ϕk(z), we get ϕk(x) < ϕk(z), as desired. If on
the contrary we have ϕk(z) < ϕk(y), there exists a concept g in Δf , g >f k, such that ϕg(y) < ϕg(z). As before,
the maximality of k implies that we necessarily have ϕg(x) ϕg(y). It follows that ϕg(x) < ϕg(z), and the proof
is complete. 
Let us denote by ≺μf the relation: x ≺μf y iff x μf y and not y μf x. It follows from the above lemma that ≺μf is a
strict partial order on O.
Example 1. Let f be the concept to-be-a-bird, and suppose that, from the point of view of an agent, its defining
feature set is given by Δf = {to-be-an-animal, to-have-two legs, to-lay-eggs, to-have-a-beak, to-have-wings}, all of
these concepts being considered as sharp concepts for the agent. Suppose also that the salience order is given by:
to-lay-eggs >f to-have-two-legs, to-have-a-beak >f to-lay-eggs and to-have wings >f to-lay-eggs.
Let r , m, t , b and d respectively stand for a robin, a mouse, a tortoise, a bat and a dragonfly, and let us compare
their relative birdhood. In order to determine the induced membership order, we first build the following array:
animal two-legs lay-eggs beak wings
robin     
mouse 
tortoise   
bat   
dragonfly   
We readily check that d ≺μf r , m ≺μf t , and m ≺μf b. Note that we have b μf d , since the concept to-have-two-
legs under which the bat falls, contrary to the dragonfly, is dominated by the concept to-lay-eggs that applies to
the dragonfly and not to the bat. On the other hand, we do not have d μf b, as nothing compensates the fact that
the dragonfly lays eggs and the bat does not. This yields b ≺μf d . We also remark that the tortoise and the bat are
incomparable, that is, we have neither b μf t , nor t μf b. The strict f -membership order induced on these five
elements is thus given by the following Hasse diagram:
We have therefore m ≺μf b ≺μf d ≺μf r and m ≺μf t ≺μf r .
We can now precisely translate the notion of membership: an object x will be considered as falling under f if x is
≺μ-maximal in O. We shall denote by Extf , the extension of f , the set of all such objects.f
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Lemma 2. The double inequality x μf y and y μf x holds if and only if ϕh(x) = ϕh(y) for all concepts h of Δf .
Proof. If ϕh(x) = ϕh(y) for all concepts h of Δf , we have clearly x μf y and y μf x. Conversely, suppose that
x μf y and y μf x. If we had not ϕh(x) = ϕh(y) ∀h ∈ Δf , there would exist a concept h of Δf such that ϕh(x) =
ϕh(y), and we could choose h with maximal salience for this property. We would have for instance ϕh(x) <h ϕh(y).
But since y μf x, there would exist k ∈ Δf , k more salient than h, such that ϕk(y) <k ϕk(x), thus contradicting the
choice of h. 
3.2. The membership function
It is clear that the ordering given by the relation μf is not connected: given two objects x and y, it may well
happen that neither x μf y, nor y μf x. It is nevertheless possible, starting from the strict partial order ≺μf , to
build, a membership function ϕf that fairly translates the notion of a degree of f -membership. This function will
satisfy ϕf (x) < ϕf (y) whenever x ≺μf y: in a sense, this is the best one can hope (see [13] and her discussion on the
impossibility for order relations to correctly represent vagueness). For this purpose, we shall proceed in a way that
parallels, though in different context, a construction we proposed in [6].
Given an object x, we say that x initializes a membership chain of length n if it is possible to find n objects
x1, x2, . . . , xn with last term xn ∈ Extf , such that x ≺μf x1 ≺μf x2 ≺f · · · ≺μf xn. For instance, any element x ∈ Extf
initializes a chain of length 0, and any object that does not fall under f initializes an membership-chain of strictly
positive length l  |Af ||Δf |. In a sense, the length of such a chain measures how distant x is from the set Extf . Note
that, given an object x, the existence and the length of such a chain is determined by the concepts and the objects the
agent has at his disposal. Each link of a chain corresponds for this agent to a real (or a fictive) given object, together
with some given concepts of the universe at hand.
Definition 3. The membership distance μf (x) of an object x to Extf is the maximal length of a membership chain
initialized by x.
The distance of x to Extf is therefore an integer that is equal to 0 if and only if x falls under f . This measure will
now be used for the definition of the membership function:
Definition 4. Let ∼ be the relation x ∼ y if μf (x) = μf (y). Denote by Af =O/ ∼ the associated quotient set and
ϕf the canonical map from O onto Af . Then the relation of total order f on Af is defined by ϕf (x)f ϕf (y) if
μf (x) μf (y).
Example 2. We take again example 1 and the Hasse diagram giving the membership order induced by the concept
to-be-a-bird on the set {robin, tortoise, bat, mouse, dragonfly}:
Let us now compare the respective membership values taken by the membership function: we have μf (t) = 1
because, to our knowledge, there exists no oviparous animal a that has a beak and satisfies t ≺μf a ≺μf r . Similarly,
we have μf (d) = 1, since, to our knowledge, there exists no animal a′ such that d ≺μf a′ ≺μf r . Since the bat falls
under three out of the five elements of Δf we have necessarily μf (b) < 3, and the inequality b ≺μf d ≺μf r then yields
μf (b) = 2. As for the mouse, we have m ≺μ b ≺μ d ≺f r , but this is not a chain of maximal length. For instance,f f
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that μf (m) 4, and thus μf (m) = 4 since we cannot have μf (m) > 5. Putting all this together, we come finally to
ϕf (m) < ϕf (b) < ϕf (t) < ϕf (r) and ϕf (t) = ϕf (f l).
Remark 1. It would be easy to normalize the set Af and obtain an ordered set isomorphic to a finite subset of the
unit interval [0,1]. For example, we may take for ϕf the f -membership degree δμf defined by: δμf = 1 − μfNμf , where
N
μ
f , the membership width of f , is the length of the longest f -membership chain initialized by an object. Such a
solution however is misleading, as it attributes the same scale of values to different concepts, which we would have no
reason to treat uniformly. Also, it may lead to fallacious comparisons and artificial problems, comparing for instance
the degree of membership of an object x relative to a concept f with that of an object y relative to a concept g.
Remark 2. The greatest element of Af is equal to ϕf (x), where x is an arbitrary element of Extf . Its least element
is equal to ϕf (z), z being any object such that μf (z) = Nμf .
We have now fully defined the notion of membership for concepts of arbitrary complexity. Observe that one easily
recovers the characterization of Δf as a set of features that are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for
an object to be considered as an instance of f : for this, we only need to assume that there exists at least an object that
falls under all the elements of Δf .
Proposition 1. Let f be an elementary concept and x an object. Then x falls under f if and only if x falls under every
concept of Δf .
Proof. It is clear that if an object x falls under all the elements of Δf , x is ≺μf -maximal and therefore falls under f .
Conversely, suppose x does not fall under all the elements of Δf , and let y be an element that falls under the elements
of Δf . Such an element exists by our assumption. We claim that we have x ≺μf y: indeed, since the elements ϕh(y) are
maximal in Ah for all concepts h ∈ Δf we have readily x f y. Next, it is clear that we do not have y f x, because,
by the choice of x, there exists a concept h ∈ Δf such that ϕh(x) <h ϕh(y) while it is impossible to find a concept
g ∈ Δf such that ϕg(y) <g ϕg(x). This yields x ≺μf y, as claimed, and we have shown that x is not ≺μf -maximal. 
Corollary 1. It holds x ≺μf y whenever y falls under f and x does not.
Proof. Straightforward. 
4. Membership for compound concepts
It is sometimes possible to determine a concept f by a concept g, and get in this way a compound concept
g  f that represents the determination of f by g. This determination is most often translated by an adjective-noun
or an adjectived verb combination (e.g. the concepts to-be-a-carnivorous-animal, to-be-a-flying-bird, to-be-a french-
student), but it can also be rendered by a noun-noun combination (e.g. to-be-a-pet-fish, to-be-a-barnyard-bird). Unlike
ordinary conjunction, the connective  cannot be defined for arbitrary pairs of concepts (f, g): for instance, if g is
the concept to-fly, f the concept to-be-an-artefact and h the concept to-be-a-prime-number, it makes sense, or at
least it may make sense for some agent, to form the concept g  f , which one would interpret as the concept to-
be-a-flying-artefact; but it would be meaningless to try and form the concept g  h corresponding to the ‘concept’
to-be-a-flying-prime-number: in this case the determination connective simply cannot operate.
It is important to keep in mind that we consider only the conceptual combinations that are intersective: the objects
that fall under the composed concept g  f are exactly the ones that both fall under f and under g. Thus, and to
mention the most known examples, the determination connective cannot be used to form complex concepts like to-be-
a-brick-factory, to-be-a-criminal lawyer or to-be-a-topless-district: indeed, a brick factory need not be a factory that
is made out of bricks, a criminal lawyer not a layer that is a criminal, and a topless district not a district that is topless.
The determination connective  operates on a principal concept to which it attributes some secondary properties
usually expressed by an intersective (extensional) adjective or an instersective adjectived verb (see for instance [12]
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the main concept f is defined through a predicate of the type to-be-x, while the accessory concept g is of the form
to-have-the-property-y. We shall say that f is g-determinable when the concept g  f can be formed. This requires
that the sets Extf and Extg have a non-empty intersection: there must exist elements of O, that is real or fictive
objects, that fall under f and under g.
Note that even when correctly defined, the determination connective does not necessarily enjoy the same properties
as its analogue in propositional logic: unlike conjunction, indeed, it is not supposed to satisfy commutativity (for
examples and discussion, and in particular the distinction between games-that-are-sports and sports-that-are-games,
see [23]).
We proceed now to the definition of the membership preorder associated with a compound concept. Our con-
struction is motivated by the fact that, unlike the elementary concepts, compound concepts are not usually associated
in with a defining feature set: dictionaries or encyclopedias do not provide answers on queries about noun–noun or
adjective–noun combinations. For this reason, we shall directly propose the construction of a composed member-
ship preorder μgf that naturally stems from the membership preorders μf and μg while taking into account the
preeminence of the principal concept f .
Definition 5. Let f and g be elementary concepts and μf and μg their associated membership preorders. Suppose
that f is g-determinable. Then the relation μgf is defined by: x μgf y if x μf y and either x ≺μf y, or x μg y.
Thus, priority is given to the concept f , translating the fact that f is supposed so play the principal role in the
composed concept.
It may be helpful to consider the relation μgf as induced by a set of fictive defining features:
Lemma 3. Let >f and >g be the salience orders on Δf and Δg . Denote by Δ˜ the set Δf ∪ Δg equipped with the
‘salience’ order > that agrees with >f on Δf , agrees with >g on Δg −Δf , and satisfies k > h for all k’s in Δf and
h’s in Δg − Δf . Then μgf is induced by Δ˜.
In other words, μgf agrees with the relation  defined by: x y iff for any concept h of Δ˜ such that ϕh(y) <h
ϕh(x), there exists a concept k of Δ˜, k > h, such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
Proof. Suppose first that we have x μgf y, so that x μf y and either x ≺μf y, or x μg y. We want to show that x  y.
Given any element h of Δ˜ such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), we have to prove the existence of an element k of Δ˜, k > h,
such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y). If h ∈ Δf , there exists k ∈ Δf , k >f h, such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y), and, since k > h, we are
done. Suppose therefore h ∈ Δg −Δf . If x ≺μf y, we do not have y μf x, and there exists therefore a concept k ∈ Δf
such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y). But then, we have k > h, and, again, we are through. Finally, if x μg y, since h ∈ Δg , there
exists k ∈ Δg , k >g h such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y). This implies k > h and provides again the desired result.
Conversely, suppose that we have x  y. To prove that x μgf y, we first show that x μf y: if ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x) for
some concept h of Δf , there exists k ∈ Δ˜, k > h such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y). But, by the construction of the preorder
>, we have necessarily k ∈ Δf and k >f h. This shows that x μf y. It remains to prove that either x ≺μf y, or x μg y.
Suppose we have not x ≺μf y. We have then the double inequality x μf y and y μf x. To prove that x μg y, let h be a
concept in Δg such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x). Since x  y, there exists a concept k of Δ˜, k > h, such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
By Lemma 2, we cannot have k ∈ Δf . We have therefore k ∈ Δg and k >g h, which completes the proof. 
Clearly, the process of defining the complex relation μgf from μf and μg can be iterated, and used to define the
membership orders associated with the determination of arbitrary concepts.
Corollary 2. The relation μgf is reflexive and transitive on O.
Proof. Clear. 
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x ≺μg y.
Lemma 4. Let f be a g-determinable concept. Then
• μgf ⊆μf ;
• ≺μf ⊆≺μgf .
Proof. Straightforward. 
As in the case of elementary concepts, we will say that an object x falls under the concept g  f if x is ≺μgf -
maximal.
Let us again denote by Ext(g  f ) the extension of the concept g  f , that is the set of all objects that fall under
g  f . As we shall see, this set can be directly retrieved from the extensions Extf and Ext g:
Proposition 2. Ext(g  f ) = Extg ∩ Extf .
Proof. Suppose x ∈ Extf ∩ Ext g. If x were not ≺μgf -maximal, there would exist an object z such that x ≺μgf z;
therefore we would have either x ≺μf z, contradicting the hypothesis x ∈ Extf , or x ≺μg z, contradicting the hypothesis
x ∈ Ext g.
Conversely, suppose that is x ≺μgf -maximal. Clearly, x is then ≺μf -maximal, and therefore falls under f . Suppose
we do not have x ∈ Extg, and let z be any element of Extg∩Extf (such an element exists since f is g-determinable).
Then we have x μgf z and x ≺μg z, that is x ≺μgf z, contradicting the ≺μgf -maximality of x. 
The above proposition helps determining in which cases a compound concept may be a sharp concept. This clearly
occurs in the particular case of the determination f  f of a sharp concept by itself, as readily follows from the
definitions. In fact, the only case where a compound concept g  f is a sharp concept occurs when both f and g are
sharp concepts having same extension:
Proposition 3. g  f is a sharp concept if and only if both f and g are sharp concepts that satisfy Extf = Extg.
Proof. Suppose first that g  f is a sharp concept. Then it is immediate that f is also a sharp concept, otherwise,
we would find three objects x, y and z verifying x ≺μf y ≺μf z, that is x ≺μgf y ≺μgf , contradicting the sharpness of
g  f . Observe now that we have Extf ⊆ Ext g. Indeed, if this were not the case, there would exist an object y such
that y ∈ Extf and y /∈ Ext g. But then we would have x ≺μgf y ≺μgf for any objects x and z such that x /∈ Extf
and z ∈ Ext g, thus contradicting our sharpness hypothesis on g  f . Observe also that if the converse inclusion
Ext g ⊆ Extf did not hold, taking u /∈ Ext g, v ∈ Extg − Extf and w ∈ Extf , we would have u ≺μgf v ≺μgf w,
which would again contradict the sharpness of g  f . Finally, to see the sharpness of g, suppose given three objects
r , s and t such that r ≺μg s ≺μg t . Since r ≺μg s and Extf ⊆ Extg, we cannot have r ∈ Extf ; similarly, we see that
s cannot lie in Extf . Since f is a sharp concept, we have therefore r μf s μf t . Putting all this together, we get
r ≺μgf s ≺μgf t , contradicting again the sharpness of g  f .
Conversely, suppose now that f and g are sharp concepts with Extf = Extg. We have to prove that g  f is sharp.
But if this were not the case, we could find three objects x, y and z such that x ≺μgf y ≺μgf z. Being not a ≺μgf -
maximal element, we would have y /∈ Ext(g  f ), hence y /∈ Extf . By the sharpness of f , this would imply x ⊀μf y,
and thus x ≺μg y. By the sharpness of g, this would finally lead to y ∈ Extg, hence y ∈ Extf , a contradiction. 
It follows from Proposition 2 that all objects that fall under g  f necessarily fall under f (and also under g).
Hence, we may naturally ask whether the compound concept g  f could be considered as a subconcept of f . In the
perspective of fuzzy logic, a concept k is a subconcept of h if and only ϕk  ϕh, that is, if and only if it holds, for all
objects x, ϕk(x) ϕh(x). In our model, this first supposes an embedding of the ordered set (Ah,h) in (Ak,k). We
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Lemma 5. For all x, μf (x) μgf (x).
Proof. Suppose that for an object x, one has m = μgf (x) < μf (x) = n, and let x ≺μf x1 ≺μf x2 ≺f · · · ≺μf xn be an
x-membership f -chain of maximal length (xn ∈ Extf ). Note that xn−1 /∈ Extf . Let z be an element of Ext(g  f ).
By Lemma 4, we have xi ≺μgf xi+1 for i < n, and it follows that x ≺μgf x1 ≺μgf x2 ≺gf · · · ≺μgf xn−1 ≺gf z, is a
membership g  f -chain of length n, contradicting the hypothesis. 
This lemma shows that the range of the function μf is embedded in that of the function μgf . Identifying the sets
Af and Agf with these ranges then yields Agf ⊆ Af . Since we have, for all x, μf (x) μgf (x), it follows, from
this identification and from the very definition of ϕ, that ϕgf (x) ϕf (x), showing that g  f is a subconcept of f .
5. Typicality for elementary concepts
How can our model render count of the fact that, inside a category, there exist elements that are more typical than
others? It is because of this evidence that the classical view on categorization had to be given up: a concept could
not be defined anymore by its extension or its associated membership function, because such a definition would not
explain the typicality effect. Membership orders and functions may be accurate enough to tell us that the penguin and
the robin are equally birds, or that the mouse is less a bird than the bat, but they will be unable to account for the fact
that, as a bird, the robin is more typical than the penguin.
We have therefore to complete and extend the formalism proposed in the preceding sections. The auxiliary set Δf
through which an agent constructs the f -membership order is not sufficient on its own to fully capture the information
encoded by f : it becomes necessary to add a supplementary set, which will consist of the features that, from the agent’s
point of view, are bond to apply to all typical instances of the concept at hand, whatever significance this term may
carry for the agent.
Together with each elementary concept f , we will therefore suppose given a finite set of characteristic features,
χf , the elements of which consist of concepts that complete and illustrate the core information that may be provided
by Δf . Note that χf ∩Δf need not be the empty set. In particular, χf may include most, if not all, of the most salient
elements of Δf . For instance, if f denotes the concept to-be-a-fruit, we may take for χf the set consisting of the
elements to-grow-on-trees, to-be-sweet, to-be-raw-edible, to-yield-juice and to-have-a-seed, while Δf will consist of
the two concepts to-be-a-vegetable and to-heave-seeds.
As was the case for Δf , the characteristic set χf will be equipped with a (possibly empty) strict partial salience
order, meant to compare the pertinence of two different characteristic features.
Again, characteristic sets and salience orders are purely subjective items: they reflect the Weltanschaung of a given
agent at a given time. For example, the characteristic features associated with the concept to-be-a-bird may consist,
for an agent, of the set {to-fly, to-have-feathers, to-live-in-the-trees, to-sing, to-have-wings}, in which the properties
of flying or of having wings are given maximal salience. For another agent, however, the characteristic set of the same
concept may consist of the elements {to-fly, to-have-feathers, to-be-oviparous, to build nests, to-have-a-beak}, the
property of having wings being considered as more salient than that of flying.
The idea of associating with every elementary concept its set of ‘characteristic’ features is due to Smith et al.
[22], and the term is theirs. The authors took care to distinguish this set from the set of necessary features, this latter
consisting of all the essential properties associated with the concept at hand (see also [4] for the distinction between
necessary features and defining features). For instance, to-fly is considered as a characteristic feature of the concept
to-be-a-bird but it is not an essential one, as it is possible to conceive birds that do not fly. On the contrary, to-have-a
beak or to-be-warm-blooded are necessary features for this concept, as each of these properties is an essential one:
one cannot conceive a bird that would not have a beak or that would be cold-blooded.
Typicality relative to a concept f may be defined for arbitrary objects, and not only for elements Extf : for instance,
Rosch and Mervis [19] included non-members of categories in their typicality rating lists. Nevertheless, as observed
in [10], typicality carries with it the assumption of a range restricted to category members. This is the position that
we will adopt.
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In order to grasp the notion of more or less typical objects, we propose the following definition, which parallels
that of the membership order:
Definition 6. Let f be an elementary concept, and x and y two elements of Extf . We shall say that x is at most as
f -typical as y, written x τf y, if for any concept h of χf such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), there exists a concept k of χf , k
more salient than h, such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
Note that in the general case, it may well happen that a less typical object x falls under a feature h ∈ χf that does
not apply to y, provided there exists a more salient feature k ∈ χf that applies to y and not to x.
It is important to observe that the above definition relates typicality relative to a concept with the characteristic
features of this concept, and only with them: it does not take into account the normality or the abnormality of the
objects at hand. To judge the typicality of a dog for instance, we do not have to examine whether it is blind, has a
wounded paw or lives with an artificial heart: there exists a clear distinction between the notions of typicality and
normality, and prototype theory only deals with the first one.
Proposition 4. For all elementary concepts f , the relation τf is a partial preorder on Extf .
Proof. Analogue to that of Lemma 5.1. 
The strict partial order induced by τf will be denoted by ≺τf . We have therefore x ≺τf y iff x f y and not y f x.
Example 3. Let us take for f the concept to-be-a-fruit and suppose that for a given agent the set χf consists of the
concepts to-grow-on-trees(tr), to-be-sweet(sw), to-be-raw-edible(ra), to-yield-juice(ju), to-have-a-skin(sk), together
with a salience order > given by: ra > tr, ra > ju, tr > ju, tr > sw, sk > ju and sk > sw. Consider the following six
fruits: a chestnut (ch), an olive (ol), a pepper (pe), a strawberry (st), an orange (or) and a tomato (to). For the sake of
simplicity, we suppose our agent attributed them only extremal membership values:
tr sw ra ju sk
ch  
ol  
pe  
st  
to   
or     
The induced typicality order is then given by the following Hasse diagram:
An important case that deserves to be mentioned occurs when the salience order on χf is a total order, a situation
we find in particular when the characteristic set is reduced to a single element—to-fly being for instance taken as the
unique characteristic feature of to-be-a-bird.
Proposition 5. Suppose the salience order >f on χf is a total order. Then τf is a total preorder on Extf . More
precisely, given two exemplars x and y of Extf , we have either x ≺τ y, or y τ x, or ϕh(x) = ϕh(y) ∀h ∈ χf .f f
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salient concept of χf such that ϕk(x) = ϕk(y). We have for instance ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y). This yields x ≺τf y: indeed, for
all concepts h of χf such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), k is more salient than h and we have ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y). Note that we
cannot have y ≺τf x, because, by a proof similar to that of Lemma 2, this would yield ϕh(x) = ϕh(y) for all h ∈ χf .
This shows that x ≺τf y as desired. 
Notation. For any subset X of Extf , we shall denote by Xτ(f ) the set of ≺τf -maximal elements of X; the finiteness
of χf implies that Xτ(f ) = ∅ whenever X = ∅.
Remark 3. Contrary to what happened in the case of the membership order, the typicality order as we defined it does
not require the preliminary use of a specific gradation function. The construction of a typicality gradation would be
of course possible, defining first a typicality distance τf , a typicality width Nτf , and a subsequent typicality degree δ
τ
f
similarly to what was done in Section 3.2. It is interesting to note that, in the case where χf is given a total salience
order, the resulting typicality degree faithfully translates the (total) typicality order ≺τf : in this case, we have indeed
x ≺τf y iff δτf (x) < δτf (y).
5.2. Typical elements
We now come to the definition of the typical instances of an elementary concept f . We shall make the assumption
that there always exists an exemplar of f that falls under all the elements of χf .
Proposition 6. Let f be an elementary concept and x an element of Extf . Then the two following properties are
equivalent:
• x falls under all the elements of χf ;
• x is ≺τf -maximal in Extf .
Proof. Analogue to that of Proposition 1. 
We shall say that an object x is f -typical if it satisfies the properties of Proposition 6. For instance, and provided
that to-fly is a characteristic feature of birds, a hen will not be considered as a typical bird: indeed, it does not plainly
fall under the concept to-fly.
Denoting by Typf the set of f -typical objects, we have readily Typf = (Extf )τ(f ) =⋂g∈χf Ext g.
Lemma 6. Given an f -typical element z, one has x ≺τf z for any instance x of f that is not typical.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 6. 
Example 4. Consider the concept to-be-a-tree, and suppose that its characteristic set includes the concept to-have-
deciduous-leaves. Suppose, on the other hand, that the concept to-be-a-conifer includes in its characteristic set the
concept to-have-evergreen-needles. It follows from our definition that the larch is atypical as a conifer, while typical as
a tree. In our framework, typicality relative to a category does not depend from membership relative to a subcategory:
for somebody ignoring that the larch is a conifer, its typicality as a tree makes no doubts. Similarly, a flying ostrich
will be considered as typical as a bird.
The classical notion of intension can now be recovered from the typical instances of f :
Definition 7. The intension Intf of a concept f is the set of all concepts g for which Typf ⊆ Ext g.
Note that f ∈ Intf and that χf ⊆ Intf .
The intension of f is the set of features that apply to all typical instances of f . For instance, the concepts to-
sing, to-fly, to-be-oviparous, to-have wings are elements of the intension of to-be-a-bird: all typical birds sing, fly,
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exists typical birds that are not black, like the robin, and typical birds that do not build nests, like the cuckoo. We
can characterize the elements of Intf as describing features that apply to the good exemplars of f , or as properties
that are generally expected from f : ‘birds generally fly’, indeed, exactly means that the birds that do not fly must be
considered as atypical. In this sense, we may interpret the elements of Intf as being induced by f , and analyze the
link between f and g as representing a relation of inference, which could be approached through the ordinary tools
of non-monotonic logics. It is this perspective that we shall develop in a forthcoming paper, where the properties of
typical induction, studied as a non-monotonic inference relation, will be studied and compared to the existing systems.
Proposition 7. Typf =⋂g∈Intf Ext g.
The proposition says that an object is f -typical if and only if it falls under all the concepts of Intf .
Proof. If x is f -typical, it falls under every concept of Intf by definition of Intf . Conversely, if an object falls under
every concept of Intf , it falls under f and it also falls under every concept of χf . It is therefore f -typical. 
In a sense, the sets Intf and Extf taken together characterize the concept f . Since the set Intf is dual of the set
Typf , we can equivalently characterize a concept by the sets Typf and Extf , which are subsets ofO. Given two sharp
concepts f and g, we can therefore consider them as equivalent, (written f ≡ g) if they have same intension and same
extension. In the case of vague concepts, it is difficult to define such a notion of equivalence without also requiring
that the membership functions of f and g are isomorphic. The question then naturally arises of finding ‘natural’
concepts f and g with Extf = Extg, Typf = Typg, but such that for some pair (x, y), one has ϕf (x) <f ϕf (y) and
ϕg(y)g ϕg(x). In the absence of such an evidence, we shall extend our notion of equivalence to elementary vague
concepts, and write f ≡ g whenever f and g have same extension and same intension.
6. Smooth subconcepts and concept determination
In this final section, we propose to investigate the internal structure of concepts. The importance of this study
appears in most of the work dealing with categorization-level and hierarchies. We shall introduce the notion of smooth
subconcepts, and show that all these concepts are obtained through a specific kind of determination.
6.1. Subconcepts
As observed at the end of Section 4, if g is a subconcept of f , we must have ϕg  ϕf , and, consequently, Ext g ⊆
Extf .
On the contrary, even if g is a subconcept of f , there may well exist no relationship between the sets Typf and
Typg. As a matter of fact, the typicality orders respectively associated with f and g are most often incomparable, and
the corresponding typical sets may have an empty intersection: for instance, and as long as we consider penguins as
exceptional birds, we will not be ready to accept as an exemplar of a typical bird any exemplar of a typical penguin.
The subconcepts g for which Typg ⊆ Typf are therefore rather exceptional. We shall qualify these as smooth
subconcepts:
Definition 8. A subconcept g of f is said to be smooth if it satisfies Typg ⊆ Typf .
Thus, g is a smooth subconcept of f if any typical exemplar of g may be considered as typical relative to f . Note
that this condition is equivalent to χf ⊆ Int g, which can also be expressed by Intf ⊆ Int g.
Example 5. The fact that we consider robins as typical birds means that any typical exemplar of a robin is a typical
exemplar of a bird. Thus, if g is the concept to-be-a-robin and f the concept to-be-a-bird, we have Typg ⊆ Typf : g
is a smooth subconcept of f .
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In fact we shall establish a representation theorem characterizing the smooth f -subconcepts as the determinations of
f by concepts that, in a way do not contradict f . But before addressing this problem, we have to study the typicality
associated with compound concepts.
6.2. The typicality of compound concepts
It is clear that the instances of a composed concept g f that we may intuitively consider as typical of this concept,
cannot be retrieved from the typical instances of f and the typical instances of g. A typical walking bird has nothing
to do with a typical bird, and nothing to do with a typical walking animal either. More generally, the attributes that are
typically induced by a compound concept cannot be retrieved by the intensions of its components: green apples are
bound to be sour, but to-be-sour is not a member of the intension of to-be-an-apple, nor a member of the intension of
to-be-green. Thus, no simple formula will enable us to deduce the typical elements of g  f from the typical elements
of f and the typical elements of g.
What conditions would we require to consider an object as typical relative to a compound concept of g  f ?
This question was experimentally addressed by [20], who showed that the context in which a concept appears affects
the typicality of its instances. For instance, for somebody that works in the context to-live-in-a-barnyard, a chicken
may be considered as a typical bird, although, relative to the concept to-be-a-bird it is not. In our framework, the
concept to-be-a-bird taken in the context to-live-in-a-barnyard is simply represented by the determination (to-live-
in-a-barnyard)  (to-be-a-bird). Studying contextual typicality then amounts to determining the set Typ(g  f ). For
this, we need to define a suitable typicality order ≺τgf . Such an order will characterize the g  f -typical elements
as maximal elements of Ext(g  f ). Note that the primary role played by f in the composition g  f implies that
the g  f -typical objects will be expected, before all, to be as typical as possible relative to f . Making use of the
typical-order relation ≺f , this amounts to saying that Typ(g  f ) should be a subset of Ext(g  f )τf , and we should
have therefore Typ(g f ) ⊆ (Ext g∩Extf )τ(f ). But this sole condition is not sufficient to ensure (g f )-typicality. To
see this, consider the following example: take for f the concept to-be-French and for g the concept to-live-in-U.S.A.
Consider the case of Mr Dupont, a French traveler arrested on his arrival at Kennedy airport for drug traffic in 1998,
condemned to 10 years jail, and since then detained in Red Onion prison, Virginia. Although typical as far as to-be-
a-frenchman is concerned, and therefore an element of (Ext g ∩ Extf )τ(f ), Mr Dupont is definitely not a prototype
of the concept to-be-a-Frenchman-living-in-the-States. For instance, it is clear that Mr Dupont is less representative
of this latter concept than Mr Martin, a French student who is now completing his PhD in Berkeley University of
California: this latter on the contrary may be seen as a typical relative to the concept (g  f ). Thus, the order induced
by g  f has to be chosen in such a way that it guarantee the typicality of all elements of ((Ext g ∩ Extf )τ(f ))τ(g)).
As we shall see now, a construction analogue to that of the membership order for compound concepts will do the job.
Lemma 7. Let f and g be two elementary concepts wit associated typicality preorders τf and τg . Suppose f is
g-determinable, and define the relation τgf on Ext(g  f ) by:
x τgf y if x τf y and either x ≺f y, or x τg y.
Then τgf is a preorder on Ext(g  f ) .
Proof. Analogue to that of Lemma 2: τgf is induced by the set χ˜ =def χf ∪χg equipped with the adequate salience
order . 
The above construction provides a typicality preorder for the determination of an elementary concept f by an
elementary concept g. It is clear that it can be recursively used for any compound concept k  h, where k and h are
arbitrary concepts.
Let ≺τgf be the strict partial order associated with the relation τgf , that is: x ≺τgf y if and only if x τf y and
either x ≺τf y or x ≺τg y. For any subset X of Ext(g  f ), we let Xτ(gf ) be the set of ≺τgf -maximal elements of X.
We shall denote by Typ(g  f ) the set of ≺τgf -maximal elements of Ext(g  f ): Typ(g  f ) = (Ext(g  f ))τ(gf ).
These elements will be considered as typical relative to the concept g  f .
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may lead to counterintuitive results: for instance, given the concept to-be-an-Antarctic-bird and following our con-
struction, the Antarctic gull will be shown to be more typical than the penguin, provided that to-fly is part of the
characteristic set of to-be-a-bird. However, when referring to Antarctic birds, people will most often consider the
penguin as more typical than the gull. This apparent contradiction comes from the fact that, in people’s mind, the
category of Antarctic birds is altogether perceived as opposed to the category of usual, or European, birds. When
referring to a member of the first category, one implicitly excludes the specimen that also lie in the second. This
phenomena is even emphasized when typicality is concerned: a typical Antarctic bird is implicitly expected be much
different from a usual bird. Thus the concept to-be-an-Antarctic-bird cannot be simply analyzed as the determination
of a concept by another, which would be the case for instance for the concept to-be-a-black-bird: it appears to convey
more information than would do a simple intersective combination.
It is possible, as we did in the case of elementary concepts, to define the intension Int(g  f ) of a compound
concept g f as the set of all concepts h that apply to all elements of Typ(g f ): Int(g f ) = {h;Typ(g f ) ⊆ Exth}.
However, and contrary to what happened in the elementary case, there exist no duality between the sets Int(g  f ) and
Typ(g  f ): the latter cannot be retrieved from the former, as was the case for elementary concepts (see Proposition 7).
This comes from the fact that one may well find no object falling under all the elements of χf ∪ χg . For this reason,
we have to refine of definition of equivalent concepts.
Definition 9. Two concepts f and g are said to be equivalent, written f ≡ g, if Extf = Ext g and Typf = Typg.
The following result provides an upper and a lower bound for the set Typ(g  f ):
Proposition 8. ((Ext(g  f ))τ(f ))τ(g) ⊆ Typ(g  f ) ⊆ (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ).
Proof. We first prove the second embedding. Let x be an element of Typ(g  f ). If x /∈ (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ), there exists
an element y ∈ Ext(g  f ) such that x ≺τf y, and we have then x ≺τgf y, contradicting the choice of x. To prove the
first inclusion, let x be an element of ((Ext(g f ))f )τ(g). If x were not ≺τgf -maximal in Ext(g f ), there would exist
an element y in Ext(g  f ) such that x ≺τgf y. Since x ∈ (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ), we cannot have x ≺τf y, and it follows
that we must have x ≺τg y. But, from the second embedding, we have y ∈ (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ), and since x was chosen in
((Ext(g  f ))τ(f ))τ(g), the latter inequality is impossible. 
In the particular case where the salience order on χf is total, the above proposition takes a simpler form:
Proposition 9. Let f be g-determinable elementary concept with totally ordered associated characteristic set. Then
Typ(g  f ) = ((Ext(g  f ))τ(f ))τ(g).
Proof. We only have to check that Typ(g  f ) is a subset of ((Ext(g  f ))τ(f ))τ(g). Let therefore x be an g  f -typical
element. By the above proposition, we know that x ∈ (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ). Suppose x where not ≺τg-maximal in this set.
Then we would have x ≺τg z for some element z of (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ). But since the salience order on χf is total, the
≺τf -maximality of z implies x τf z by Proposition 5. We have then x ≺τgf z, which contradicts the choice of x. 
In this particular case, the proposition shows that, in order to get the typical elements associated with g  f , one
has to simply choose among the most f -typical exemplars of Ext g  f those that are also the most g-typical.
Note that the typical representatives of the concept g  f are generally not chosen among the elements of Typf .
Proposition 9 shows that the definition of τgf is coherent with the intuitive definition of Typ(g  f ), which has to
include ((Ext g ∩ Extf )f )g as a subset.
Example 6. Let us take again Example 4 and take for f the concept to-be-a-tree and for g the concept to-be-a-
conifer. By what we saw, the larch may be considered as f -typical, so it is an element of (Ext(g  f ))τ(f ). It is also
≺g-maximal in this set, so the larch may be considered as g  f -typical. It cannot be considered as f  g-typical,
though, because it is not an element of (Ext(g  f ))τ(g): the pine tree, for example, is more g-typical than the larch.
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Then
• τgf ⊆τf ;
• (˜≺τf ) ⊆≺τgf .
Proof. The embedding τgf ⊆τf directly follows from the definition of τgf . For the second part of the proposition,
suppose that x and y are elements of Ext g ∩ Extf with x ≺τf y. We have then x τgf y. If we had y τgf x, this
would imply y τf x by the first part of the proposition, contradicting the choice of x and y. This shows that x ≺τgf y
as desired. 
Remark 4. If x is at most as typical as y relative to the concept g  f , x will also be at most as typical as y relative to
the concept f . This conclusion does not hold for arbitrary subconcepts of f : the larch is less typical as a conifer than
the pine tree, while more typical as a tree.
Proposition 10 enables us to compare the typicality orders induced by f and g  f ; it cannot be used however to
compare the resulting degrees (see Remark 3). On one hand, we may have δτf (x) > δτgf (x), as happens for instance
when x is f -typical and falls under g without being ≺g-maximal in (Ext(g  f ))f ; on the other hand, we may also
have δτf (x) < δ
τ
gf (x), as is for the case when x is g  f -typical but not f -typical (e.g. a striped apple). Thus our rep-
resentation of typicality orders neither predicts, nor contradicts the well-known conjunction effect, [17] pp. 198–199,
following which an object that falls under a compound concept g  f will be often considered a ‘better example’ of
the category g  f than of the category f alone.
For an illustration of the conjunction effect, let us study the example of the striped apple that was discussed by [16]:
Example 7. Let f be the concept to-be-an-apple, and g that of to-have-stripes. We suppose that Nτf , the typicality
width of f (see Remark 3) is equal to 5. We may then attribute the value 6 to Nτgf . We take for x a particular kind
of apple that we suppose sour, without a stem, and with regular stripes on its surface. We let x1 be a second apple,
similar to x except that it is not sour, and x2 be a third apple similar to x1 except that it has a stem. Finally, we denote
by x3 a typical apple. Note that x2 is g  f -typical but is not f -typical. We have now x ≺gf x1 ≺gf x2, showing
that the (g  f ) typicality distance of x is equal to 2, and its corresponding degree to 2/3. On the other hand, we
have x ≺f x1 ≺f x2 ≺f x3: indeed, x2 cannot be considered a typical apple because typical apples are not striped.
It follows that the f -typicality distance of x is equal to 3 and its corresponding degree to 2/5. We have therefore
δτgf (x) > δ
τ
f (x): the degree of x relative to the compound concept g  f is strictly greater than its degree relative
to f .
As a first property of the determination connective, we observe it satisfies idempotence. It also satisfies associativity,
provided the concepts h  (g  f ) and (h  g)  f are defined:
Proposition 11. The following equivalences hold:
• f  f ≡ f ;
• h  (g  f ) ≡ (h  g)  f .
Proof. We have readily Ext(f  f ) = Extf and Typ(f  f ) = Typf , which proves the first part of the proposition.
To prove the second equivalence, we have to check that Typ(h  (g  f )) = Typ((h  g)  f ). Let therefore x be a
≺τh(gf )-maximal element of Exth ∩ Ext g ∩ Extf . If x were not (h  g)  f -maximal, there would exist y such
that x ≺τ(hg)f y, that is x τf y and either x ≺τf y or x ≺τhg y. In the first case, we get x ≺τgf y, and therefore
x ≺τh(gf ) y, contradicting the choice of x. In the second case, we get x τf y, x τg y and either x ≺τg y, or x ≺τh y.
But the inequalities x τf y and x ≺τg y yield x ≺τgf y, that is x ≺τh(gf ) y, and the same conclusion is obtained if
we suppose that x τ y, x τg y and x ≺τ y. In any case, this contradicts the choice of x.f h
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element y such that x ≺τh(gf ) y. We would then have x τgf y and either x ≺τgf y or x ≺τh y. In the first case, we
would have x τf y and either x ≺τf y or x ≺τg y, both leading to x ≺τ(hg)f y. In the second case we have x τgf y
and x ≺τh y, which amounts to x ≺τh y, x τf y and either x ≺τf y or x τg y. If x ≺τf y, we get directly x ≺τ(hg)f y.
If x τg y and x ≺τh y, we get x ≺τhg y, which, together with x τf y, leads again to x ≺τ(hg)f y, a contradiction. 
We shall now establish a necessary and sufficient condition for g  f to be a smooth subconcept of f . Recall that
h is a smooth subconcept of f if Typh ⊆ Typf . We first make a definition:
Definition 10. A concept g is exceptional for f if Typf ∩ Ext g = ∅.
A concept g that is exceptional for f applies to no typical instances of f . For instance, the concept to-be-poisonous
is exceptional for the concept to-be-a-fruit: indeed, no typical fruit is poisonous.
Proposition 12. Let f be an elementary g-determinable concept. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. g is not exceptional for f ;
2. Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Typf ;
3. Typ(g  f ) = (Typf ∩ Extg)τ(g).
Proof. Suppose first that g is not exceptional for f , and let x be an element of Typ(g  f ). Denote by z an element
of Typf ∩ Ext g. If x were not an element of Typf , we would have x ≺f z (Lemma 6); since z ∈ Ext(g  f ), this
would contradict the ≺f -maximality of x in this set. This shows that 1 ⇒ 2. Conversely, suppose that we have
Typ(g f ) ⊆ Typf and let z be an element of Typ(g f ). Then z is an element of Ext g∩Extf and therefore of Extg.
We have thus z ∈ Typf ∩ Ext g, showing that this set is not empty, and hence that g is not exceptional for f . We have
therefore 1 ⇔ 2 as desired.
Supposing now Typ(g  f ) ⊆ (Typf ), let us show that Typ(g  f ) = (Typf ∩ Ext g)τ(g). Let x be an element
of Typ(g  f ). If x were not ≺τg-maximal in Typf ∩ Extg, there would exist y ∈ (Typf ∩ Ext g) with x ≺τg y. Since
x τf y, this would yield x ≺τgf y, contradicting the choice of x. We have therefore proven that Typ(g f ) ⊆ (Typf ∩
Ext g)τ(g). To prove the converse inclusion, take an element x of (Typf ∩ Ext g)τ(g). If x were not ≺τgf -maximal, we
would have x ≺τgf y for some element y ∈ Extg ∩ Extf . By the ≺τf -maximality of x, this would imply y ∈ Typf
and x ≺τg y, thus contradicting the choice of x. 
Example 8. Any typical exemplar of the concept to-be-a-black-bird is also a typical exemplar of the concept to-be-
a-bird, because there exist typical birds that are black. The conclusion would be of course different if we were to
look for typical pink birds: the American flamingo, for instance, can be considered as a typical pink bird, but not as a
typical bird.
Corollary 3. Typ(g  f ) = (Typf )τ(g) for all g ∈ Intf .
Proof. Since g ∈ Intf , we have Typf ⊆ Ext g, and the result immediately follows from Proposition 12. 
The corollary means that, g being a characteristic feature of f , the typical exemplars of g  f will be the most
g-typical among the typical exemplars of f .
We finally mention as a particular case the only example where the set Typ(g  f ) can be directly recovered from
the sets Typf and Typg.
Proposition 13. Typ(g  f ) = Typg ∩ Typf if and only if Typf ∩ Typg = ∅.
For instance, a typical black olive is nothing but a typical olive that is typically black.
Proof. Straightforward. 
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a subconcept h of f is smooth if Typh ⊆ Typf .
Theorem 1. A concept h is a smooth subconcept of f if and only if there exists a concept g, not exceptional for f ,
such that h ≡ g  f .
Proof. We already notice that (g  f ) is a subconcept of f . If g is not exceptional for f , we have Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Typf
by Proposition 12, and it follows that g  f is a smooth subconcept of f . Conversely, let h be a smooth subconcept
of f . Then f is h-determinable. Note that h is not exceptional for f , since f applies to any typical instance of h. We
claim that h ≡ h  f . Indeed, observe first that Ext(h  f ) = Exth ∩ Extf = Exth, since Exth ⊆ Extf . Next, since h
is smooth, and by Proposition 13, we have Typ(h  f ) = Typh ∩ Typf = Typh. This shows that the concepts h and
h  f have same intention and same extension, and they are therefore equivalent. 
6.3. Concepts and formal concept analysis
The determination connective  provides interesting results concerning the structure of the lattice of formal sub-
concepts. Let us first recall the basic definitions of Formal Concept Analysis [7].
A formal context is a triple (G,M, I) where G is a set of objects, M a set of attributes and I a binary relation
between these two sets: the property (g,m) ∈ I is to be read as “the object g has the attribute m”. A formal concept
of the formal context (G,M, I) is then defined as a pair (A,B) with A ⊆ G and B ⊆ M such that
• B = {m ∈ M | (g,m) ∈ I ∀g ∈ A};
• A = {g ∈ G | (g,m) ∈ I ∀m ∈ B}.
The set B is therefore the set of all attributes of M that are shared by all objects of A; similarly, A is the set of all
objects that have in common all the attributes of B . In the terminology of FCA, A is called the extent of the formal
concept (A,B), and B is its intent.
If (A,B) and (A′,B ′) are formal concepts, one has clearly A ⊆ A′ iff B ′ ⊆ B . When this is the case, (A,B)
is called a formal subconcept of (A′,B ′), and (A′,B ′) a formal superconcept of (A,B). This will be denoted by
(A,B) (A′,B ′). The set L(G,M, I) of formal concepts of a given formal context (G,M, I) is then partially ordered
through the relation . An important result in FCA is that this ordered set (L(G,M, I),) has the structure of a
complete lattice.
In our framework, the formal context we are working in is the triple (O,F , I ), where O is the set of objects that
form the universe of discourse of a given agent, F his set of concepts and I the relation (x,h) ∈ I iff x falls under h.
A formal concept then consists of a couple (A,B) where A is a set of objects, B a set of (individual) concept such
that
• f ∈ B if and only if f applies to all elements of A;
• x ∈ A if and only if x falls under all concepts of B .
In particular, Proposition 7 shows that for any elementary concept f , (Typf, Intf ) is a formal concept.
We can also define another class of formal concepts, using the notion of extension: let indeed Essf , the essence
of f , be defined as the set of all concepts g that apply to the elements of Extf . Then, it appears that (Extf,Essg) is
a formal concept:
Proposition 14. For each concept f , denote by Essf the set of concepts g such that Extf ⊆ Extg. Then one has
Extf =⋂g∈Essg Ext g.
Proof. If x is an element of Extf , x falls under every concept of Essf by definition of Essf . Conversely, if x falls
under every element of Essf , x must fall under f , since f ∈ Essf .
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It does not mean however that Essf should be identified with the set of core properties of f , which determine the
meaning of f : to take Fodor’s example [4], each of the concepts to-have-a-backbone and to-have-a-heart is part of
the essence of the other, but none can be considered as a core feature of the other.
The above result shows that for all concepts f (Extf,Essf ) is a formal concept. This enables us to reinterpret the
notion of smooth subconcepts in the framework of Formal Concept Analysis:
Proposition 15. Given two elementary concepts f and h, h is a smooth subconcept of f if and only if (Exth,Essh)
(Extf,Essf ) and (Typh, Inth) (Typf, Intf ).
Proof. Immediate. 
Let us write h  f whenever h is a smooth subconcept of f . This clearly yields an order relation in the quotient
set F/ ≡, because one has h ≡ f whenever h  f and f  h. We do not obtain a lattice structure, as was the case in
Formal Concept Analysis for the relation, but it is possible to find a greatest lower bound for -commuting concepts,
and this greatest lower bound turns out to be their mutual determination.
Theorem 2. Let f and g be mutually determinable concepts. Then f and g admit common lower bounds if and only
if Typf ∩ Typg = ∅. When this condition is satisfied, they admit a greatest lower bound, which, up to equivalence, is
equal to the determination of f by g.
Proof. If f and g admit a common lower bound, there exists a concept k such that k  f and k  g. By definition,
we have then Typk ⊆ Typf ∩ Typg, and this latter set is therefore non-empty. Conversely, suppose that we have
Typf ∩Typg = ∅. Then it follows from Proposition 13 that Typ(g f ) = Typg∩Typf . As we also have Ext(g f ) =
Ext g ∩ Extf , we see that g  f  f and g  f  g. The determination of f by g is therefore a lower bound of the
set {f,g}. Note that we have g  f ≡ f  g. Suppose now that, k is a smooth subconcept of f and of g, that is k  f
and k  g. We have then Exp k ⊆ (Expf ∩ Expg) and (Typ k ⊆ Typf ∩ Typg). This shows that k  g  f . We have
therefore proven that, up to equivalence, g  f is the greatest lower bound of the set {f,g}. 
7. Conclusion and future work
The present work is a first an attempt at setting a suitable framework for the study of categorization and typicality
problems. It is essentially centered on the basic notions of membership and typicality, these notions being defined
through the defining feature set and the characteristic set attached to a concept. We obtained in this way a coherent
theory for elementary and compound concepts. This preliminary work will be completed in a forthcoming paper, in
which we shall show how the study of non-monotonic logics applies to categorization and prototype theory, providing
interesting and non-trivial results. We shall indeed reinterpret the notions of membership and typicality in the frame-
work of inference relations: thus, the set Essf will be considered as a set of consequences of f , and the relation
g ∈ Essf , denoted f  g, will play the role of a consequence relation. Similarly, typical inference will be denoted
by f |∼ g, and will be studied as a non-monotonic inference relation. We shall show that, relative to the determination
connective , the relation  behaves like the classical monotonic consequence relation, while |∼ satisfies properties
analogous to those of rational inference relations. The tools recently developed in the study of preferential and rational
inference relations will therefore appear as a useful complement for the study of classical problems in categorization
theory, leading in particular to interesting results concerning the theory of contextual inference.
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